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I 
In the history of Western thought there has been no 
greater exponent of philosophical pessimism than Arthur 
Schopenhauer, the nineteenth century post-Kantian. 
Though Mandelbaum, an authority on nineteenth century 
thought, denies that Schopenhauer's Weltanschauung con-
tains any particularly 'novel insight', his contribu-
tion to Western thought is minimized if one sees him 
merely as a systematizer of "diverse strands of thought 
into a single encompassing system."1 Neither should 
conjectures of Schopenhauer's reputed atheism blind one 
from determining more closely what constitutes his 
atheism. And, a fortiori, such bias should not blind 
one from considering what Schopenhauer has to say about 
Christianity. 
The objective of this article is to go beyond this 
scotosis and analyze the relationship between 
Schopenhauer's philosophy of the denial of the will-to-
live and Christian asceticism. Following the ground-
work already laid by Harry J. Ausmus 2, this inquiry has 
a twofold purpose: in the first place, it aims to 
establish why Schopenhauer's philosophy of the denial 
of the will-to-live can be seen as an attempt to demy-
thologize Christian asceticism; and secondly, it aims 
to determine whether that supposed demythologization is 
interpretative or destructive. 
II 
But, before this inquiry can begin, the debris 
which lies on our path must first be cleared. I refer 
here to the intellectual bias that traditionally has 
prevailed concerning Schopenhauer's 'atheistic' stance. 
The following are some examples: Hollingdale writes 
that Schopenhauer's philosophy is atheistic and that 
"there is no God in Schopenhauer's world as will and 
idea."* Russell, though refraining from declaring 
categorically that Schopenhauer is an atheist, writes 
that Schopenhauer "dislikes Christianity, preferring 
the religions of India, both Hinduism and Buddhism."" 
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Copleston suggests that Schopenhauer's philosophy of 
salvation is more Buddhist than Christian. 5 And 
Gardiner contends that a world view such as 
Schopenhauer's without any 'benevolent deity' would be 
totally lacking in a morally acceptable design.' 
Upon scrutiny, however, the aforementioned opinions 
are at least open to question. For, in the first 
place, Schopenhauer himself appears to leave room for 
the existence of God in his writings. Or, at least, he 
does not deny the existence of God outright: 
. . . the impossibility to prove the existence of 
God does not in the least call into question that 
existence itself, for it stands on much firmer-
ground (viel sicherem Boden). Indeed, it is a 
matter of revelation (Es ist ja Sache der 
Offenbarung), and of course this is the more cer-
tain, as it was vouchasafed solely and exclu-
sively to those who for that reason are called 
the chosen race.' 
In the Christian religion the existence of God is 
an established fact (eine ausgemachte Sache) 
beyond and above all investigation. This is as 
it shoule be; for here it properly belongs and is 
established by revelation (durch Offenbarung 
begründet). I therefore regard it as a mistake 
on the part of the rationalists, when they at-
tempt in their dogmas to demonstrate the ex-
istence of God otherwise than from the 
Scripture.• 
Hence, there is doubt as to whether Schopenhauer in 
fact does deny that God exists. For while it may be 
argued that he does not take God as seriously real in 
his We1tanschauung, this is a far cry from calmly as-
serting His total absence. 
Secondly, though Schopenhauer did admire the 
sapiential writings of the East,' and notwithstanding 
the fact that his philosophy of salvation is akin to 
the Buddhist doctrine of the four truths, 1 0 this cer-
tainly is not to say that he 'dislikes' Christianity as 
Russell maintains. Granted, he does grant to Buddhism 
a preeminence over other religions, but he also states 
that his philosophizing has not been under its 
influence. 1 1 Schopenhauer does in fact leave room for 
'genuine Christianity' which, as he interprets it, 
propounds ascetical self-denial upon recognition of the 
inherent evil of existence—especially in lieu of the 
hope for a 'better world'. 1 2 
It can be argued that Schopenhauer is as interested 
in Christianity as he is in Buddhism because both con-
tain the theme of asceticism and quietism which "is 
identical with that of all metaphysics and ethics." 1 1 
The ascetical character and tendency, which is 
described in his philosophy as denial of the will-to-
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live, is not only characteristic of the religions of 
the East with their suppression of desire, but in 
"genuine and original Christianity, as it was developed 
in the writings of the Church Fathers from the kernel 
of the New Testament."** Consequently, his 'dislike' 
of Christianity has to be considered against the back-
drop of of his admiration for the ethical tendencies of 
both Christianity and Buddhism. For as Schopenhauer 
writes: "In truth it is not Judaism with its 
TiavTct KaAa H a v ('All was very good.') but Brahmanism 
and Buddhism that in spirit and ethical tendency are 
akin to Christianity.111* 
Thirdly, even Gardiner's contention that Schopen-
hauer's We1tanschauung lacks a morally acceptable 
design is open to dispute. For though it can be argued 
once again that God is not really real in Schopen-
hauer's world picture, he does not state that the world 
is devoid of a morally acceptable design. In Parerga 
and Paralipomena, the work of Schopenhauer's later 
years, he states: "That the world has only a physical 
and not a moral significance is a fundamental error, 
one that is the greatest and most pernicious, a real 
perversity of the mind. At bottom, it is also that 
which faith has personified as antichrist." 1' 
Suffering, moreover, can have meaning. In fact, ac-
cording to Schopenhauer, it can be considered metaphys-
ically to be a 'blessing'.1T 
Having at least wounded three of the cows fed by 
philosophical prejudice and bias, the stage is now set 
for an examination of the relationship between Schopen-
hauer's doctrine of the denial of the will-to-live and 
the ethical aspect of Christian asceticism. After all, 
Schopenhauer in Parerga and Paralipomena claims that 
his teaching can "Mae called Christian philosophy 
proper, paradoxical as this may seem to those who do 
not go to the root of the matter, but stick merely to 
the surface. 
At this juncture, therefore, I propose to 'go to 
the root of the matter* and take up the gauntlet 
Schopenhauer offers. Why can Schopenhauer's philosophy 
of the denial of the will-to-live be considered a demy-
thologization of Christian asceticism? 
Ill 
Prior to answering why Schopenhauer's philosophy of the 
denial of the will-to-live can be considered a demytho-
logization of Christian asceticism, it shall be neces-
sary to analyze briefly Schopenhauer's distinction 
between representation and will. For it is precisely 
here where the meaning of justice, charity and self-
denial can be exhibited." Without a general 
understanding of Schopenhauer's phenomena-noumena dis-
tinction, the significance of his claims about Chris-
tian spirituality cannot adequately be grasped. 
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In the very first sentence of The World as Will and 
Representation Schopenhauer makes an important claim: 
^The world is my representation (Die Welt ist meine 
Vorstellung): this is ä truth valid with reference to 
every living and knowing being, although man alone can 
bring it into reflective, abstractive consciousness." 2 4 
What does this mean in general lines? 
In the first place, it signifies that all knowledge 
is basically representational*'--which is to say that 
we can never know a given object x directly--or in-
itself; a subject-object relationship is necessarily 
presupposed. Or, to quote Schopenhauer, "between things 
and us there always stands the intellect." 2 2 
Everything that exists independent from myself—and 
which I know—is "inevitably associated with this 
being-conditioned by the subject, and exists only for 
the subject. , , 2 , Thus, it is 1 who impose the cate-
gories of my understanding (Verstand) upon the sensa-
tions which I receive from that which exists indepen-
dently from them in the 'external world'. The a priori 
category of the understanding with its forms of causal-
ity, time and space "creates and produces the objective 
external world of a few sensations in the organs of 
sense."2* 
But the representational knowledge of the world 
leaves much to be desired. The intellect and its a 
priori categories are not designed to give us knowledge 
of the 'true* nature of things. According to Schopen-
hauer, representational knowledge of things outside us 
"can never be identical with the being-in-itself of the 
thing outside me 1 1. 2' The world, Schopenhauer asserts, 
is much more than the end result of this type of 
knowledge that cannot penetrate the deep recesses of 
the self in which the 'ultimate secrets' lie. 2 8 
Herein the influence of Kant is visible. Kant 
likewise emphasized the phenomena-noumena distinction. 
However, he denied the possibility of knowing things in 
themselves. 2 7 Metaphysical knowledge of the in-
itselfness of reality is impossible in the Kantian 
Weltanchauung. 
Admitting with Kant that representational knowledge 
cannot pierce the riddle of existence, Schopenhauer 
differs from him in that he opened the possibility for 
another type of knowledge which comes from within the 
recesses of the consciousness2'--that in turn manifests 
itself in acts of desiring, striving, wishing, longing, 
etc. 2 9 Unlike representational knowledge which is 
mediated and more indirect, this type of knowledge 
gives one a direct intuition of what he is in himself. 
It is the type of knowledge by which one is aware of 
pain and pleasure. Schopenhauer calls this type of in-
tuitional knowledge will. 1 0 
Schopenhauer continues by asserting that it is 
totally different than representational knowledge which 
is mediated through the category of the understanding. 
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He writes that it is "neither a perception (for all 
perception is spatial), nor is it empty, on the con-
trary, it is more than any other knowledge . . . it is 
not a priori, like merely formal knowledge, but en-
tirely a posteriori, hence we are unable to anticipate 
it in the particular. M I 1 
Since this knowledge is so different from represen-
tational knowledge, Schopenhauer's next logical step is 
understandable: namely, that the laws of phenomenal 
knowledge do not apply to it except for the form of 
time.'2 For the will as such is known only through 
particular acts which are known a posteriori. But what 
is interesting to note is that Schopenhauer asserts 
that this type of knowledge is the key to understanding 
the riddle to both man and universe. For if one 
recalls, according to Schopenhauer, the secrets to the 
world lie within man himself. It is this different 
type of knowledge which reveals what reality is in-
itself. , J 
Schopenhauer's illicit logical step, therefore, is 
clearly visible. For the immediate and intimate 
knowledge one has of himself as a willing and striving 
being is transferable to the whole of reality. Even 
the forces of nature, according to Schopenhauer, are 
identical with the will in ourselves.1* Thus, the word 
'will' describes that force within ourselves and every-
thing in the world which is "the sole kernel of every 
phenomenon (der alleinige Kern jeder Erscheinung)." I S 
The inner knowledge which we supposedly have of 
ourselves, therefore, has been hypostasized into a 
force and applied to the whole of phenomena. "Consid-
ered purely in itself", Schopenhauer writes, "(the 
will] is devoid of knowledge and is only a blind, ir-
resistible urge (nur ein blinder, unaufhaltsamer 
Drang), as we see it appear in inorganic and vegetable 
nature and their laws and also in the vegetative part 
of our life." 1' Its nature is always to strive without 
final satisfaction: 
At all grades of its phenomenon from the lowest 
to the highest, the will dispenses entirely 
without an ultimate aim and object. It always 
strives, because striving is its sole nature, to 
which no attained goal can put to an end. Such 
striving is therefore incapable of final satis-
faction; it can be checked only by hindrance, but 
in itself goes on forever. 1 7 
Schopenhauer's illogical jump is akin to an evolu-
tionary process which occurred in the Hindu religion, 
to which Thomas Berry alludes." At a specific period 
in the history of Hindu thought, the unity between 
Atman and Brahman was perceived. Atman and Brahman, as 
the supports of Being, both came to represent the su-
preme reality as experienced respectively in the sub-
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jective and objective orders. To put it simply, the 
difference between the two words, for all practical 
purposes, collapsed. For Atman was identified with 
Brahman. 
In Schopenhauer's philosophy it is the same subjec-
tive will that is present in the whole of reality. As 
such, therefore, it appears that it is not the individ-
ual per se who wills to live--who is the conglomeration 
of concrete willing and needing—that is foremost in 
Schopenhauer's philosophy. For as Schopenhauer writes: 
"what craves so impetuously for existence is merely in-
directly the individual; directly and properly speak-
ing, it is the will-to-live in general, which is one 
and the same in all." 1* Hence, will as thing-in-itself 
is identically present in every phenomenon. It is only 
with increasing consciousness as manifested in the 
higher levels of the will's objectification that suff-
ering and the will's horror increases. And in man with 
his faculty of Vernunft the suffering is especially 
tragic.*0 
Why the suffering? Why the horror? Because the 
basis of all willing is "need, lack, and hence pain", 1 , 1 
suffering is essential to life. For the will's striv-
ing is insatiable; its nature is to perpetually 
strive.*1 For nothing can possibly satiate the will. 
As such a Summum Bonum is a contradiction in the 
Schopenhauerian We1tanschauung. 'Good' in Schopen-
hauer's eyes is a relative concept related only to the 
desiring will. The so-called Summum Bonum would be 
that which could halt the striving and longing of the 
will. But such a reality is impossible given Schopen-
hauer's presuppositions.** 
In the Schopenhauer!an Weltanschauung it is evil 
which is positive, good is negative. For willing, in 
which pain and need are intertwined, is what is 
primary. The 'good' which is defined only in reference 
to the desiring will, is at best illusory; for the will 
can never be satiated. 
IV 
Now, since the will is the primordial force of 
reality, man as a phenomenon in which the will objecti-
fies itself, "is concrete willing and needing through 
and through; he is a concretion of a thousand wants and 
needs. "** The faculty of Vernunft, moreover, increases 
the motives of the will. For man alone transcends the 
eternal present. Both the future and the past are his 
concerns. 
His consciousness, in short, is filled with will-
ing. As such, knowledge remains at the service of the 
will—which points towards objects that would seemingly 
alleviate the pain of existence.** But the flux of 
life rolls irresistibly on. Despite the ephemeral 
nature of existence, man blinds himself to this unhappy 
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fact, acting as if it were not. For as Schopenhauer 
writes: "This is the life of almost all men; they 
will, they know what they will and they strive after 
this with enough success to protect them from despair, 
and enough failure to preserve them from boredom and 
its consequences."*' 
But though suffering and death everywhere prevail, 
he alone consciously revolts against his fate. The 
nothingness from which he comes haunts him. He seeks 
an answer as he marches irresistibly toward the abyss 
of non-existence whence he came. His heart ripped apart 
by the decree of the Fates, he none the less affirms 
the will-to-live (der Wille zum Leben)* 7 convinced that 
nature's verdict cannot be right. Yet, in the final 
analysis, the rocks of death loom in the horizon and 
destroy the phenomenon whose expression he is. 
Moreover, because each man is aware of himself 
directly and of others only indirectly,** egoism 
characterizes his very self--the core of his being. 
Man is quite naturally more prone to achieve the ob-
jects of his own willing than those of another. He is 
much more apt to define the 'good' in reference to his 
own will--and all too often at the expense of another. 
He is, as Schopenhauer states, "ready to annihilate the 
world, in order to maintain his very self, that drop in 
the ocean . . . "*' 
Man, therefore, is in the center of a world stage 
torn apart by a fierce struggle in which individual en-
tities strive to affirm their own particular wills. , , 
In him the ferocity of the struggle is most intense. 
For unlike animals, for example, who use force to at-
tain their individual ends, man can place cunning at 
his will's service. As Schopenhauer observes: "I, as 
the wrongdoer, compel the other individual to serve my 
will instead of his."* 1 In short, man's nature cannot 
be satisfied by the mere affirmation of his own needs. 
He advances beyond the affirmation of his bodily needs. 
And because there is to be found in every human being 
"a store . . of hatred, anger, envy, rancour, and 
malice",*1 he even goes to the extreme of basing his 
happiness on the miseries of others. As Schopenhauer 
writes, "it is the will-to-live |as expressed by the 
individuall which, more and more embittered by the con-
stant suffering of existence, seeks to lighten its own 
pain and distress by inflicting them on others."* 1 
Is there any hope for the human condition then? 
How can man recognize the oneness of reality if his 
knowledge of the other is representational and indi-
rect? How can he possibly realize that by inflicting 
suffering upon the other he thereby fights against that 
which he himself is--namely an instance of the will's 
objectification? Shackled to the principle of suffi-
cient reason,** affirmation of the will (die Bejahung 
des Willens) appears inevitable. s s 
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But Schopenhauer asserts that man is a special phe-
nomenon in that he can transcend his condition. Only 
in him can freedom (independence from the principle of 
sufficient reason which, as such, belongs only to the 
will as thing-in-itself) 'possibly1 appear in the phe-
nomenal expression of himself as an intellectual 
being. 
In this regard Schopenhauer is like Kant who, in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, established the possibil-
ity of freedom and necessity existing together.*7 
However, unlike Kant, Schopenhauer does not believe 
that the concept of freedom arises from "an inference 
either from the Speculative Idea of an unconditioned 
cause, or from the fact that the categorical imperative 
presupposes it. , , s , Rather, Schopenhauer stresses that 
the concept of freedom arises from the immediate 
knowledge of one's will in the human consciousness (" . 
. . unmittelbare Erkenntniss des eigenen Willens ^ ^ ^ 
im menschlichen Bewusstseyn . . . " ) . * ' The problem 
with man is that he is also a phenomenon and consequen-
tly governed by the principle of sufficient reason. 
Because the will in ordinary consciousness is con-
fused with the phenomenon, what belongs to the will as 
thing-in-itself (freedom) is attributed to the phenome-
non. Therein arises what Schopenhauer calls the 
"delusion of the individual's unconditioned freedom."" 
Freedom, argues Schopenhauer, is tied with the notion 
of responsibility (die Verantwortlichkeit). Because of 
"the wholly clear and certain feeling of the responsi-
bility for what we do, of the accountability for our 
actions", the objective possibility for having acted 
otherwise exists.' 1 
Servitude to the will may be transcended insofar as 
the consciousness of freedom which everyone has, pre-
sents the objective possibility for non-affirmation of 
the will. Man, according to Schopenhauer, can escape 
the vicious circle in which he seemingly is ensnared. 
He can transcend the suffering and ennui about him. He 
can pierce the veil of Maya which veils the oneness of 
reality. 
However, Schopenhauer's reflections on the possi-
bility of transcending the will are watered down by his 
stressing that the character of man is like the natural 
forces in that it is original, unchangeable and 
inexplicable." He states clearly: 
. . the difference of characters is innate and 
ineradicable. The wicked man is born with wick-
edness as much as the serpent is with its pois-
onous fangs and glands; and he is as little able 
to change his character as the serpent its 
fangs." 
It would appear then that character reform is pos-
sible only in some. For those inexplicably cursed with 
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irreformable characters, transcending the will, it 
would seem, would not be a real possibility. Schopen-
hauer's ethic of liberation or salvation is geared for 
the few. For in Schopenhauer's We1tanschauung most men 
are doomed to perpetually undergo the throes of suffer-
ing and ennui because of the constancy of their 
characters. 
V 
Because of the difficulties hitherto alluded, it is 
more accurate to state that for Schopenhauer some men 
are capable of abandoning knowledge of individual enti-
ties as such. Some are capable of transcending servi-
tude to the principle of sufficient reason which en-
tails two steps: aesthetic contemplation and denial of 
the will-to-live which in turn can lead to a rigorous 
asceticism—once again on the part of some. 
Both steps concern a different type of knowledge 
whereby the individual can transcend the representa-
tional knowledge he has of particular entities as mul-
tiplied by the principle of sufficient reason. In the 
first stage this type of knowledge is called aesthetic 
contemplation—be it the appreciation of a landscape, 
music or a piece of art. Such contemplation is dif-
ferent from knowledge of particular things insofar as 
the perceiver becomes the pure subject of knowledge, 
knowing only the Ideas (in which the will immediately 
objectifies itself)—and not their particular in-
stances. '* 
Individuality as such, therefore, is forgotten or 
laid aside. The motives which induce the will to oper-
ate are stilled. The perceiver continues to exist, of 
course, but only as "the pure subject, as the clear 
mirror of the object, so that it is as though the ob-
ject alone existed without anyone to perceive it."'* 
According to Schopenhauer, in this plateau of transcen-
dence, the perceiver can no longer be separated from 
the object of his perception. For the entire con-
sciousness is filled by this strange perception: 
When . . . an external cause or inward disposi-
tion suddenly raises us out of the endless stream 
of willing, and snatches knowledge from the 
thraldom of the will, the attention is now no 
longer directed to the motives of willing, but 
comprehends things free from their relation to 
the will. Thus it considers things without in-
terest, without subjectivity, purely objectively 
. for that moment we are delivered from the 
miserable pressure of the will. We celebrate the 
sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the 
wheel of Ixion stands still." 
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Hence, the perceived individual thing is raised to 
"the idea of its species, and the knowing individual to 
the pure state of will-less knowing, and now the two, 
as such, no longer stand in the stream of time of all 
other relations.'"7 Tragically, however, this plateau 
can be scaled only with great difficulty. And, being 
at best a fleeting phenomenon, aesthetic contemplation 
can bring no lasting peace from the ever-present will. 
Despite the fact that life's inner nature is recog-
nizable upon reflection, the individual persists in 
satiating the metaphysical will. Shackled to the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason, he affirms the will-to-live 
seeing only the diversity of phenomena. And because 
man wills with knowledge, guilt gnaws at his con-
science. 
But, for the few enlightened, a more permanent 
liberation can be attained--which need not follow from 
the first stage of liberation. This higher type of 
knowledge, according to Schopenhauer, can actually si-
lence the will's fury. For as he writes, "the denial 
of the will-to-live (die Verneinung des Willens zum 
Leben) shows itself when willing ends with that know-
ledge, since the peculiar phenomena known then no 
longer act as motives of willing, but the whole 
knowledge of the inner nature of the world that mirrors 
the will, knowledge that has grown up through apprehen-
sion of the Ideas, becomes the quieter of the will 
(Quietiv des Willens), and thus the will freely abol-
ishes itself (der Wille frei sich selbst aufhebt) 
It is the enlightened individual who can glimpse 
the noumenon which objectifies itself in the totality 
of phenomena. It is he who can recognize the same will 
constantly striving in each phenomenon. Thus, he will 
no longer see the difference between the one who in-
flicts suffering and the one doomed to endure it. For 
as Schopenhauer states, "tormentor and tormented are 
one." 7 8 
But what is it that wills? Is it the universal 
will that craves and desires? Or is it the individual? 
Does not the individual have almost a secondary role? 
For Schopenhauer implies that it is the will which af-
firms itself and likewise denies itself. But if the 
will is blind, how can affirmation or denial be predi-
cated of it? For if the will is blind and irresisti-
ble, how can it have power to turn on itself and deny 
itself? And supposing that it did have the power to do 
so, why cannot this same will turn on itself in the 
lower grades of its manifestation? 
Notwithstanding the difficulties these questions 
put forth, it is no suprise that Schopenhauer returns 
to the conscious and knowing subject (who, at times, 
appears secondary) when discussing both the affirmation 
and denial of the will. Accordingly, it is to man with 
his faculties of Verstand and Vernunft that velle 
(willing) and nolle (not-willing) concern. 
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The second plateau of the denial of the will-to-
live, then, is not the absorption of the perceiver into 
the object of perception—a process which is, at best, 
temporary and fleeting. Rather, in this phase of lib-
eration, the individual undergoes a gradual transforma-
tion insofar as he increasingly denies what he once so 
vehemently willed. Coming to a better understanding of 
existence, he shrinks in horror at the fact that that 
which he wills so fiercely is what he is at the core of 
his being—the very x-eality which adds to his suffer-
ings, namely the will. Thus, the more enlightened the 
person becomes, the more he will begin to deny his very 
self which is the highest expression of the metaphysi-
cal will. 7 1 
But at no point does the conscious being annihilate 
his proper selfhood. For, as Schopenhauer writes, the 
subject of velle and nolle "is one and the same and 
consequently, as such, is not annihilated by one act or 
the other." 7 1 Thus, denial of the will-to-live does 
not signify the total annihilation of a conscious sub-
ject (die Vernichtung einer Substanz). Rather, as the 
older Schopenhauer writes in Parerga and Paralipomena, 
it signifies "the mere act of not-willing; that which 
hitherto willed no longer wills (das Selbe was bisher 
gewollt hat, will nicht m e h r ) ^ 7 1 
Suicide, it is interesting to note, is not a form 
of the denial of the will-to-live. The reputation of 
Schopenhauer being the philosopher of suicide is a 
gross fabrication. For as he writes: 
Far from being denial of the will, suicide is the 
phenomenon of the will's strong affirmation (ein 
Phänomen starker Bejahung des Willens). For 
denial has its essential nature in the fact that 
the pleasures of life not its sorrows, are 
shunned. The suicide wills life (Der Selbst-
mörder will das Leben), and is dissatisfied 
merely with the conditions on which it has come 
to him. Therefore, he gives up by no means the 
will to live, since he destroys the individual 
phenomenon. 7 4 
The will as the noumenal reality is not affected by 
the act of suicide—and this despite the destruction of 
the individual phenomenon.7* The will cannot be denied 
through force. Rather, the path toward salvation lies 
in the embrace of suffering through painstaking denial 
of the will-to-live. Schopenhauer's own words clalfy 
the above: 
The will can't be abolished by anything except 
knowledge. Therefore the only path to salvation 
is that the will should appear freely and without 
hindrance, in order that it7* can recognize or 
know its own inner nature. 7 7 
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VI 
The second stage of denial of the will-to-live is 
gradual and can be reached only with great difficulty. 
At this point in the discussion one may well wonder why 
Schopenhauer's view of reality has been given so much 
attention in light of the article's purpose. However, 
as the argumentation progresses, it will become evident 
that the meaning of compassion, love, and asceticism is 
connected with the distinction Schopenhauer draws 
between the world as representation and will. Accord-
ing to the indirect knowledge given through representa-
tion, entities independent of the perceiver seem 
totally different from the perceiver. One's conscious-
ness stubbornly asserts the aforementioned fact. But 
the inner, intuitive knowledge we have of ourselves 
suggests that that which is independent of the per-
ceiver is what the perceiver is--namely will. Thus 
Gardiner is right in stating that "the inner import and 
meaning of justice, of charity, and also--ultimately— 
of self-denial, can be satisfactorily exhibited through 
(Schopenhauer's) original distinction between appear-
ance and reality in terms of idea and will." 7• 
In his essay On the Basis of Morality Schopenhauer 
distinguishes between what he calls 'the principle of 
ethics* (das Princip der Ethik—which is nothing more 
than the quintessential statement of the line of con-
duct demanded by an ethical system) and the 'foundation 
of ethics' (das Fundament der Ethik) which explains why 
one ought to do this or that. In a word, since Scho-
penhauer considers "neminem laede, imo omnes quantum 
potes juva" (Injure no one; on the contrary, help ev-
eryone as much as you can.) 7' to be the ethical prin-
ciple of most systems, he aims to discover its ground. 
It is interesting to note that Schopenhauer never 
denied that man was capable of lawful or just actions. 
He did, however, question whether most men were capable 
of disinterested actions. The following illustrates 
this: 
We should be childishly mistaken if we 
thought that all the just and lawful acts of man-
kind had a moral origin . . . In reality, univer-
sal honesty and uprightness, as practiced in 
human intercourse and affirmed in the most un-
shaken maxims rests mainly on two external 
necessities: first, on the order of the law 
whereby everybody's rights are protected by pub-
lic authority, and secondly, on the recognized 
necessity of a good name or civil honor for mak-
ing one's way in the world." 
Even religious faith is rarely so firm as to result 
in a disinterested morality. Selfishness too often is 
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disguised under so-called 'good acts'. For example, 
one can treat his neighbor well for fear of what may 
happen in an after life. Schopenhauer does not deny 
outright the existence of a genuine morality or of in-
dividuals who may practice it. But he does suggest 
that "we moderate our expectations of the moral ten-
dency in man and consequently of the natural foundation 
of ethics." , 1 
Thus, since Schopenhauer believes that egoism and 
moral worth mutually exclude each other ("Die 
Abwesenheit aller egoistischen Motivation ist also das 
Kriterium einer Handlung von moralischem Werth. " ) , T l ~ 
then our task is to examine briefly the disinterested 
morality which reveals itself in justice, charity and 
self-renunciation. 
In the first place, Schopenhauer believes that all 
virtues flow from justice (die Gerechtigkeit) and char-
ity (die Menschenliebe) each of which have their root 
in compassion (das Mitleid)." As such, therefore, 
justice and disinterested love are the cornerstones of 
ethics. Justice is the first state in the path to sal-
vation because in authentic justice the suffering of 
another becomes one's motive insofar as it counteracts 
egoistic and malicious motives preventing one from 
causing suffering to another and becoming the cause of 
another's pain.'* 
It is important to note that one is motivated to be 
'authentically' just not because of a set of reasoned 
dogmas, religions, myths, concepts or education. 
Rather, 'authentic' justice is connected with compas-
sion which is "an undeniable fact of human conscious-
ness . . (a knowledge which is] 'original and 
immediate' (ursprünglich und unmittelbar) residing in 
the depths of human nature. M , r The just man (der 
Gerechte) is he who has realized in a partial manner 
that the other person is what he himself is. Given 
this knowledge, he is motivated to act differently. 
Neminem laede (harm no one) becomes a reality for him. 
Enlightened by this new knowledge, the path to disin-
terested virtue in principle becomes possible. For as 
Schopenhauer writes: 
Genuine goodness of disposition, disinterested 
virtue, and pure nobleness of mind . . . do not 
come from abstract knowledge. But it is a direct 
and intuitive knowledge that cannot be reasoned 
away, or arrived at by reasoning; a knowledge 
that, just because it is not abstract, cannot be 
communicated, but must dawn on each of us. It 
therefore finds its real and adequate expression 
not in words, but simply in deeds, in conduct, in 
the course of a man's life.*' 
The just man, therefore, is not just because he 
fulfills the requirements which society sets as a mini-
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mum for justice. No, a man is just because the suffer-
ing of another has become his motive for different 
behavior. He no longer is affected merely by his own 
suffering. Now the sight of another's suffering and 
pain moves him to such an extent that he will not con-
sciously and willingly cause another's misery. His 
compassion will be such that the knowledge he now has 
will prevent him "from being the cause of another's 
pain." , T 
Clearly willing has not disappeared in the just 
man. Though he has begun to see through the principle 
of sufficient reason insofar as he places others on his 
level and sees them on equal terms, the process of 
denial of the will-to-live is by far incomplete. "The 
just man", writes Copleston, "has penetrated the prin-
ciple of individuation, the. veil of Maya, to the extent 
of setting others so far on a level with himself that 
he does them no injury; but he has not risen to the 
height of looking on others as one with himself, his 
penetration of the illusion of individuality is as yet 
very limited."** 
The man who has advanced to the stage of love (die 
Menschenliebe) has advanced to another plateau in the 
Schopenhauerian Weltanschauung. He will go beyond the 
just man who "never in the affirmation of his own will 
goes to the length of denying the will that manifests 
itself in another individual . . ."•* Quite logically, 
the distinction between his ego and that of another is 
not as great. Less shackled to the principle of suffi-
cient reason, the noble person (der Edle) is he whose 
intuitive knowledge has bridged the chasm between him-
self and others.* 0 He differs from the just or good 
man in that his compassion not only restrains him from 
injuring another, but moves him to actively aid the one 
in need.*1 In him the maxim omnes quantum potes juva 
becomes a reality. 
At first glance it may seem that the positive ac-
tions of the latter differentiate the two stages. But, 
upon analysis, it is the knowledge (die Erkenntnis) 
which the individual has that distinguishes the two 
stages. The knowledge of the 'noble' man is different 
in that he has grasped more profoundly the nature of 
the blind craving of the will. Schopenhauer describes 
the noble person: 
The principium individuationis, the form of the 
phenomenon, no longer holds him so firmly in 
grasp (befängt ihn nicht mehr so fest) Jmy 
emphasis], but the suffering he sees in others 
touches him almost as greatly as does his own. 
He therefore tries to strike a balance between 
the two, denies himself pleasures, undergoes pri-
vations, in order to alleviate another's suffer-
ings. He perceives that the distinction between 
himself and others, which to the wicked man is so 
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great a gulf, belongs only to the fleeting and 
deceptive phenomenon. He recognizes immediately, 
and without reasons or arguments, that the in-
itself of his phenomenon, is also that of others, 
namely the will-to-live which constitutes the in-
ner nature of everything, and lives in all; in 
fact, he recognizes that this extends even to the 
animals and to the whole of nature; he will not 
cause suffering even to an animal.'2 
Because he is so acutely aware of another's suffer-
ing, the noble person is moved to go out of himself 
toward the other. Insofar as his actions are not moti-
vated by his own weal, as such they can be called 
'disinterested'. It is this recognition of the suffer-
ing of another which leads to charity (agape, Caritas). 
In Parerga and Paralipomena Schopenhauer states that it 
is compassion (des Mitleid) "which alone is the &Y<Stfn 
to which the gospel summons us."' 1 
Hence, it is in compassion as manifested by posi-
tive actions that the barrier between individuals is 
abolished ("die Schranke zwischen Ich und Nicht-Ich für 
den Augenblick aufgehoben sei"). r* One no longer looks 
at "the other as alien. As Schopenhauer writes: "On 
the contrary, I share the suffering in him (in ihm 
leide ich mit), in spite of the fact that his skin does 
not enclose my nerves.'"* 
Now, whether what is described above is possible is 
a valid question. For even according to the logical 
implications of Schopenhauer's world picture, a disin-
terested morality does not seem possible. If it is the 
case that the knowing subject can never know the will 
totally in itself being that the form of time remains 
even in the new, intuitive form of knowing, it is valid 
to infer that no one can ever completely transcend the 
principle of individuation. If the principle is what 
brings man to his egoism, it would follow that one can 
never completely discard his chains. As such, a to-
tally disinterested morality is impossible. We can 
only speak of a disinterested ethics in terms of de-
grees. For experience tells us that many so-called 
'loving' actions are indeed seldom entirely selfless. 
The scalpel of Truth invariably reveals subtle motiva-
tions . 
Notwithstanding the fact that disinterested love 
would warrant the plaudits of all, there is another 
plateau to be scaled on the road to salvation: the 
stage which results in a self-denying and rigorous 
asceticism." For the ascetic knowledge of reality has 
become so profound that disinterested moral actions are 
no longer enough. The intuitive knowledge he has of 
reality compels him to advance beyond Menschenliebe. 
Wishing the best for the other no longer satisfies the 
aridity of his spirit. For his knowledge has become so 
advanced that he alone realizes that what he is in the 
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depths of his being is what the whole of reality is: 
namely, the continually striving will. But because he 
also comes to know that this will is an evil force, ex-
istence becomes perplexing and loathsome for him. 
Thus, his will turns on itself and begins to deny its 
evil essence. Calling this phenomenon the "transition 
from virtue to asceticism" (der Übergang von der Tugend 
zur Askesis), Schopenhauer writes that it is no longer 
enough for (the ascetically inclined) to love others as 
himself, and to do as much for them as for himself, but 
there arises in him a strong aversion to the inner 
nature whose expression is his own phenomenon, to the 
will to live, the kernel and essence of that world 
recognized as full of misery."'7 
The ascetic, therefore, will begin to deny or mor-
tify his body which is healthy and strong. An initial 
step to the mortification of the body is the renuncia-
tion of any sexual satisfaction. For, as Schopenhauer 
explains, "voluntary and complete chastity is the first 
step in asceticism or the denial of the will-to-
live. " " Having recognized the inner nature of ex-
istence, it is he who rejects any possibility of per-
petuating the misery of the world through sexuality. 
Sexuality, as the chief expression of the metaphysical 
will, is evil. Schopenhauer even makes the conjecture 
that since all phenomena are interlinked, were the 
ascetical maxim to become universal, lower manifesta-
tions of the will would likewise disappear." 
Schopenhauer's hypotheses here again are difficult 
to accept. Quite obviously, the strong attraction of 
the sexual impulse seems to preclude the possibility 
that the ascetical maxim become universal. Moreover, 
it does not necessarily follow that, with hypothetical 
destruction of the highest manifestation of the will, 
the lower manifestations would likewise disappear. 
Life, as we know it, would simply be different. 
But be that as it may, the important notion is that 
chasity and celibacy are the first stages of asceti-
cism. But the chastity and celibacy which Schopenhauer 
advocates are rooted in the inherent worthlessness of 
existence. 
The ascetical state is further enhanced when volun-
tary and intentional poverty arise as ends in them-
selves 1 — s o as to mortify the will. The ascetic then 
welcomes any suffering that will come to him either 
through chance or wickedness. For, as Schopenhauer 
writes, "he gladly accepts them as opportunities for 
giving himself the certainty that he no longer affirms 
the will, but gladly sides with every enemy of the 
will's phenomenon that is his own person.""' The 
ascetic will go to the extent of fasting, self-
castigation, and self-torture for the purpose of fur-
ther breaking down and killing "the will that he recog-
nizes and abhors as the source of his own suffering ex-
istence and of the world's." 1 0 2 For all practical pur-
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poses, therefore, the will as such will have already 
been crushed when death finally comes—the death which 
the ascetic will accept as "a longed-for 
deliverance". 1 0' 
By way of emphasis and clarification, Schopenhauer 
in no way implies that the ascetic is unhappy. Quite 
the contrary! Because the ascetic has reached the 
state of nirvana, Schopenhauer believes that only he is 
truly happy. The great pessimist who indulged in the 
pleasures of life, wistfully wonders about this plateau 
of salvation, stating: 
how blessed must the life of a man whose 
will is silenced not for a few moments, as in the 
enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed 
completely extinguished, except for that last 
glimmering spark that maintains the body and is 
extinguished with it. Such a man, who after many 
bitter struggles with his own nature, has at last 
completely conquered, is then left only as a pure 
knowing being, as the undimmed mirror of the 
world. , 0* 
For the ascetic, therefore, the world with all its 
multiplied phenomena—with all its galaxies and milky 
ways—is 'nothing' (Nichts). 1 0* However, this is not 
to say that the word Tiothing' is to be taken 
literally. Schopenhauer is describing an experience--a 
phenomenon—which transcends the realm of philosophy 
proper because in this high stage of denial of the 
will-to-live, subject and object become one. Phe-
nomenal knowledge (by which one sees reality as diverse 
and multiplied) is swallowed up by the higher intuitive 
knowledge one has to such an extent that the phenomenon 
does seem to be 'nothing' in comparison to the revela-
tion one has received of will. 1 0' 
The older Schopenhauer in no way implies that 
'nothing' is the end result of the nirvanic experience 
of the ascetic. Insofar as individuality is not depen-
dent solely upon the principium individuation!s, but 
upon the thing-in-itself as well, , 0 T it follows that 
the experience of the ascetic does involve a something 
that is real—but a 'something' which eludes the 
philosopher's linguistic grasp. Clearly, the ascetic 
has been illuminated. Reality for him appears radi-
cally different. Thus, what he sees now makes what he 
formerly saw appear as 'nothing'. , G , 
With complete denial of the will being the only 
path to deliverance from the fierce grasp of the will, 
Schopenhauer believed that his philosophy alone pointed 
the path to salvation in a language free of mythical 
and religious overtones. For as lie writes: 
it may be that the inner nature of 
holiness, self-renunciation, of mortification of 
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one's own will, of asceticism, is here for the 
first time expressed in abstract terms and free 
from everything mythical, as denial of the will-
to-live (die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben), 
which appears after the complete knowledge of its 
own inner being has become for it the quieter of 
all willing. On the other hand, it had been 
known directly and expressed in deed by all those 
saints and ascetics who, in spite of the same in-
ner knowledge (geicher innerer Erkenntnis), used 
very different language according to the dogmas 
which their faculty of reason had accepted, and 
in consequence of which an Indian, a Christian, 
or a Lamaist saint must each give a different ac-
count of his own conduct, but it is of no impor-
tance as regards the fact . . . it is all the 
same. 1 0 ' 
Schopenhauer, therefore, is making two central 
claims: (1), that his philosophy of the denial of the 
will-to-live is an abstract, myth-free explanation of 
the path which culminates in self-denying asceticism; 
and (2), that the asceticism of the philosophically-
enlightened is the same as that of the Indian, 
Christian, or Lamaist saint. Each, in his opinion, 
have the same inner knowledge. But are they the same? 
Are not Höffding and Copleston correct in maintaining 
that Schopenhauer's ethic is not motivated by a higher 
end (e.g. the beatific vision of God, blessedness in a 
future life, re-absorption into the Absolute, or union 
with the One)?" 9 
VII 
Because Schopenhauer claims that his philosophy of 
the denial of the will-to-live is identical with that 
of genuine Christianity,' 1 1 his assertions directly 
bear upon the reflective glances of theologians. In 
The World as Will and Representation he writes that the 
ascetical spirit of genuine Christianity was present in 
the writings of the earliest Christian communities: 
Christianity is nearest at hand, the ethics of 
which we have mentioned, and leads not only to 
the highest degree of charity and human renuncia-
tion. The germ of this last side is certainly 
present in the writings of the Apostles, yet only 
later is it fully developed and explicitly ex-
pressed. 1 1 1 
In his analysis of Christian asceticism, Schopen-
hauer was aware of the fact that Christian spirituality 
developed via certain stages. He knew that the intense 
mortifying asceticism espoused by his philosophy was 
not present in the earliest Christian writings. Citing 
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several Christian ascetics such as Francis of Assisi, 
Philip Neri, Madame de Guyon, and Meister Eckhart, 1 1 1 
he implicitly maintains that the New Testament as such 
did not advocate a mortifying asceticism, as did, for 
example, the Desert Fathers. "In my opinion", states 
Schopenhauer, "the teachings of these Christian mystics 
are related to those of the New Testament as alcohol is 
to wine, in other words, what becomes visible to us in 
the New Testament as if through a veil and mist, stands 
before us in the works of the mystics without cloak or 
disguise, in full clearness and distinctness." 1 1* 
Schopenhauer, therefore, implies that there has 
been a nuancing of Christian spirituality as the cen-
turies came and went. True, early Christianity did ad-
vocate a disinterested morality. 1 1* But what 
Schopenhauer underscores is that it was only after the 
third century that asceticism as an ideal was 'em-
phatically urged' . 1 1* 
Nevertheless, Schopenhauer clearly claims that the 
seed for a later flowering of Christian asceticism was 
already present in the gospels and New Testament 
writings. 1 1 7 Many of the qualities characterizing the 
ascetic ideal were already espoused by the early 
Christian communities. Writes Schopenhauer: 
We find commanded by the Apostles love for our 
neighbour as for ourselves, returning of hatred 
with love and good actions, patience, meekness, 
endurance of all possible affronts and injuries 
without resistence, moderation in eating and 
drinking for suppressing desire, resistence to 
the sexual impulse, even complete if possible for 
us. Here we see the first stages of asceticism 
or of real denial of the will; this last expres-
sion denotes what is called in the Gospels de-
nying the self and taking of the cross upon 
oneself. (Matt, xvi, 24, 25; Mark viii, 34, 35; 
Luke ix, 23, 24; xiv. 26, 27, 33.) This tendency 
soon developed more and more, and was the origin 
of penitents, anchorites and monasticism, an 
origin that in-itself was pure and holy, but for 
this very reason, quite unsuitable to the great 
majority of people. 1 1 0 
In later additions to The World as Will and 
Representation Schopenhauer cites several New Testament 
passages which, in his eyes, recommend 'genuine and 
pure celibacy'--the first step in authentic denial of 
the will-to-live. 1" He adds also that, though marri-
age did receive the sanction of the Church as a 
'concession' for those who lack the strength to aspire 
to the ideal, celibacy and virginity are the ideal 
through which one enters the 'ranks of the elect' and 
attains 'the victor's crown'. 1* 0 
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As far as the injunction to voluntary poverty is 
concerned, Schopenhauer believed that the Sermon on the 
Mount contained "an indirect injunction to voluntary 
poverty and thus to the denial of the will-to-live. 1 , 1 , 1 
Interestingly enough, however, Schopenhauer does 
not give any example from the New Testament advocating 
physical mortification and hatred of the body. Implic-
itly, then, he seems to be aware of the fact that the 
New Testament does not advocate the above as an ideal 
in-itself. In On the Basis of Morality he states only 
that New Testament spirituality propounds a disin-
terested morality citing Matthew 6:3 as an indication 
of the above. 1 2 1 
We can agree with Schopenhauer's contention that 
the New Testament contained implicit references to 
celibacy, voluntary poverty, and disinterested moral-
ity. But it is difficult to follow Schopenhauer's as-
sertion that bodily mortification in itself is a 
Christian ideal, particularly during New Testament 
times. Schopenhauer, however, it may be stressed, is 
not prepared to categorically admit that his doctrine 
of the denial of the will-to-live is identical with the 
main line of Christian spirituality as found in the New 
Testament. He merely contends that affinities exist. 
For, in the first place, Schopenhauer cannot accept 
the relationship between the Old Testament and the New 
Testament. Like the early Christian Gnostics, who 
found it difficult to reconcile the New Testament with 
the Old, 1 2 2 Schopenhauer finds it impossible to adhere 
to the naVTOt icaAa Afav of the Book of Genesis. Since 
he cannot accept the doctrine espoused by both the Old 
and New Testament concerning the essential goodness of 
creation, it is understandable why Schopenhauer 
believed that the Gnostics in their extreme idealiza-
tion of celibacy and chastity were in keeping with what 
he called "the spirit of the New Testament". 1 2* 
Nevertheless, Schopenhauer is right when he asserts 
that with the passage of time asceticism became, in 
fact, the ideal. Emphasizing the superiority of vir-
ginity and continence over legitimate marriage, it 
became the Christianity par excellence. I 2 > Though 
Scripture says that creation is good (Genesis 1), 
Schopenhauer correctly notes that the Church Fathers 
are often ambiguous. For on the one hand they write 
that the whole of creation is good—which presumably 
includes sexuality and marriage. On the other hand, he 
notes that the Fathers see abstinence as the ideal. 
Why the discrepancy? Schopenhauer cites a number of 
references from the writings of Clement of Alexandria, 
Tertullian, Athanasius, and Augustine as examples of 
the above ambivalence. 1 2 8 
At this point, then, it should be evident that what 
Schopenhauer basically is claiming is that the ideal 
Christian spirituality is that of asceticism notwith-
standing its insistence upon the goodness of creation. 
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But it is important to note that what Schopenhauer has 
in mind is primarily the often negative asceticism 
which arose in the third, fourth and fifth centuries of 
the Church's history. 1 2 7 Since much of traditional 
Christian spirituality did tend to emphasize the overly 
negative aspects of life, 1 2* Schopenhauer's contentions 
cannot readily be dismissed. For it can be substanti-
ated that Christian tradition has been characterized by 
an unhealthy attitude to what is human in m a n -
especially in the area of sexuality. 1 2' 
From the above discussion one can see why Schopen-
hauer was convinced that his doctrine of the denial of 
the will-to-live could be considered a 'Christian phil-
osophy' in a demythologized sense. For if authentic 
Christian asceticism is perceived to entail a renuncia-
tion of life because of its intrinsic evil, one can see 
certain affinities between Schopenhauer's philosophy 
and the sometimes negative view of life espoused by 
certain forms of asceticism in the history of 
Christianity. 
The question remains, however, whether the above 
demythologization is interpretative or destructive. To 
what extent does Schopenhauer have justification for 
his claims? It is this issue that must finally be 
addressed. 
VIII 
It cannot be denied that asceticism had replaced 
martyrdom as the Christian ideal by the middle of the 
fourth century. 1 , 0 With the recognition of 
Christianity as the official religion, the great perse-
cutions ended. Because the minds of fourth-century 
Christians were still governed by the memories of the 
martyrs who died for the faith, it is not at all sur-
prising that the new ideal of fleeing to the desert to 
pursue holiness was seen as the new martyrdom by which 
the demons of hell were trampled under foot. 1 1 1 
Though it is true to say that ascetics devoted to 
prayer, chastity, and fasting were already recognized 
and respected groups within Christian congregations by 
the end of the second century, 1 2 2 the asceticism of the 
third, fourth, and fifth centuries became an increas-
ingly complex phenomenon. For the imitation of Christ 
was no longer the only motivation for ascetical 
behavior. Though it remained the primary motivation, 
there occurred a tendency of considering mortification 
not merely as a discipline for the soul, but as a means 
for its release. The desert was seen as the ideal 
place to attain to that mortification impossible for 
the city dweller. Those who went to the desert, there-
fore, began to comprise an elite. For as Owen Chadwick 
states: "If the body is the enemy, those who torture 
it must attain a holiness impossible to those who con-
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tent themselves with the mitigated restraints of rea-
sonable self denial." 1" 
But, if true Christian spirituality entails union 
with God or imitation of Christ, 1 1* why was withdrawal 
from the world seen as so essential? Is it merely 
because the lack of a threat of persecution opened the 
way for a lax Christianity? Another important factor 
seems to be involved—as several scholars have 
asserted. 1 1 * 
There evidently occurred a complex shift in world 
outlook sometime between the second and third centur-
ies—a change which resulted in the intense other-
worldliness of the fourth and fifth centuries. 1 , 8 As 
Jonas has substantiated in his study on Gnosticism, 
"the sublime unity of the cosmos and God |was] broken 
up, the two (were] torn apart, and a gulf never com-
pletely to be closed again (was] opened." 1 1 7 The 
cosmos in effect became negatively charged and was emp-
tied of its divine content. 
E. R. Dodds in Pagan and Christian in an Age of 
Anxiety likewise argues that with the progressive with-
drawal of divinity from the phenomenal world, there en-
sued a corresponding devaluation of the human. Con-
tempt for the human condition, writes Dodds, "was a 
disease endemic in the entire culture of the period", 
manifesting itself not only in Christian and Gnostic 
circles, but in pagan centers as well. 1 , 1 
Given the radical change in world outlook that had 
been evolving during the early centuries of Christian-
ity, the popularity of the semi-dualistic Sentences of 
Sextus 1 1* even among less-educated Christians during 
the third century is more easily understandable. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Origen found the maxims 
congenial to his way of thinking, had the new world 
outlook (which had been slowly evolving) not affected 
Christians of the third century and following, it is 
doubtful that the maxims would have survived as a col-
lection of highly'admired 'Christian' aphorisms. 
In short, union with God entailed withdrawal from 
the material world. Because the sacramental use of it 
was de-emphasized, it is understandable why asceticism 
became the spirituality par excellence. For it was the 
ascetic who truly divorced himself from the encumbrance 
of the phenomenal world. It was he who had mustered 
the fortitude necessary to accept the consequences of 
longing to reach God. Wiles sheds light on this 
matter: 
If progress in the vision of God is directly 
proportionate to the measure of man's withdrawal 
from the things of this world, then the genuinely 
religious man has no option but to adopt the life 
of a solitary hermit. So there grew up an ideal 
of ascetic piety in which man seeks the eradica-
tion of the passions, seeks consciously to rid 
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himself as far as possible of all that is nat-
urally and distinctly human. 1* 8 
Hence, Schopenhauer is on target when he contends 
that asceticism became the spirituality par excellence 
by the latter part of the third century. This can be 
stated regardless of the fact that Schopenhauer does 
not take God as seriously real in his world picture. 
For there was a deprecation of the phenomenal world in 
the milieu of the times which led to the belief that 
the ascetic who shunned the phenomenal world to attain 
union with God was indeed living the superior calling. 
In conjunction with the above, Schopenhauer is 
right in asserting that virginity and celibacy became 
the cornerstones of the ascetic ideal. For, as Pourrat 
contends, the earliest form of asceticism most widely 
observed was the practice of continence freely chosen 
by certain members of both sexes. 1* 1 Chadwick, 
moreover, states that by the second century virginity 
was beginning to appear as " . . . the act of asceti-
cism par excellence . . . " U 1 
Moreover, there was especially in the third century 
a tendency in some Christian circles to link hope for 
the glory of God with the injunction to sexual pur-
ity. 1* 1 In an age where the lines between orthodoxy 
and heresy were still blurred, living like the angels 
became an ideal espoused by some Church Fathers already 
in the late second and third centuries. Minucius Felix 
in The Octavius, for example, wrote of the Christians 
of his time: ff . . . the desire (referring to unfaith-
fulness and fornication] is so far from our thoughts 
that some even blush at the idea of a chaste union."1** 
The fifth century Sayings of the Fathers are replete 
with this ideal, as are the Conferences of Cassian. *-** 
Even Ambrose, the great bishop of Milan, advocated the 
above ideal. 1*' 
This negative attitude toward sexuality is evident 
in the apparently common phenomenon of Christians tak-
ing Matthew 19:12 too literally. Though self-
mutilation was never condoned, it is interesting to 
note that there was much ambivalence concerning the 
matter.'*7 For example, Eusebius (c. 265- c. 340), 
though not condoning Origen's supposed self-mutilation, 
appears to at least praise his misguided zeal for the 
gospel. 1*' Justin Martyr, living in the mid-second 
century, recounts the story of a young man who peti-
tioned the perfect Felix in Alexandria for permission 
to be made a eunuch. '*' He likewise seems to have an 
admiration for such misguided zeal. Even John 
Chrysostom (334-407), while bitterly attacking the 
practice, at least gives valuable information concern-
ing the practice which must have still been a problem 
during his day. 1* 9 
Thus, when Schopenhauer alludes to sexuality as the 
chief hurdle to be overcome on the path to denial of 
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the will-to-live, he is in line with many of the early 
Christian ascetics who often went to the point of the 
ridiculous to preserve their chastity. 1 5 1 Pourrat con-
tends that it was impurity (nopvefot ) which was the 
vice most dreaded by the monks of the desert. 1 , 1 The 
eccentric Jerome (349?-420) is a case in point. 
Struggling with temptation, he writes: 
I was often surrounded by dancing girls. 
My face was pale from fasting, and my mind was 
hot with desire in a body as cold as ice. Though 
my flesh, before its tenant, was already as good 
as dead, the fires of the passions kept burning 
within m e . 1 5 1 
Corresponding to the ideal of strict chastity and 
virginity was the patristic depreciation of the body 
and the worldly. Keeping in mind the chasm that had a-
risen between God and the phenomenal world, one is more 
apt to understand why the body was considered a prison 
of the soul by many ascetics. 1 9* Chadwick writes that 
the "semi-dualistic atmosphere inherited from pagan 
philosophy drove some ascetics to think they must blame 
the body, that the body held the soul bound and impri-
soned in its tomb, and therefore the mortification 
aimed at a physical object, the laceration and repres-
sion of the body that the soul might be f r e e d . M l M The 
body was such an encumbrance, thought Origen, that be 
believed that the Holy Spirit was not only absent in 
conjugal intercourse, but in other physical activities 
as well. **• 
In order for anyone to reach a state of holiness, 
therefore, the body had to be crushed by physical, 
self-imposed crucifixion. Interpreting Mathew 11:12 
("From the days of John the Baptist until now the king-
dom of heaven has suffered violence, and men of vio-
lence take it by force." RSV) as a scriptural justifi-
cation for their harsh practices, some Fathers believed 
that the greater the violence done to themselves, the 
nearer they were to the kingdom of God. 1* 7 Thus, many 
fasted to the point of unhealthy excess in their desire 
to kill the flesh. 1" 
Finally, just as the ascetic in Schopenhauer's cri-
tique welcomes death as the final liberation from the 
thraldom of the will, so too are there elements in the 
Christian tradition that, while considering death as 
the final step to perfection, likewise believed it to 
be a liberation. Death becomes almost a formality to 
be passed through. For the greatest part of killing 
the flesh has long been accomplished. The ascetic, 
therefore, welcomes death peacefully.1*' 
From this short inquiry, there are at least some 
elements in Schopenhauer's philosophy of the denial of 
the will-to-live that are interpretative of certain 
strata within Christian asceticism. It is clear that 
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much can be found in the Christian tradition (especial-
ly in the third, fourth, and fifth centuries) that 
downplays the phenomenal order and the physical aspect 
of man. Schopenhauer recognized this and was right in 
bringing it to the attention of all. 
IX 
However, despite the separation between God and the 
cosmos that ensued and the resulting devaluation of 
human experience that occurred as a result, it is im-
portant to note that God was never left out of the 
ascetics' picture. Though otherworldly and transcen-
dent. He was always taken as seriously real and the ob-
ject of their striving. Schopenhauer, on the other 
hand, albeit he admitted the possibility of a theism, 
does not really take God as seriously real. God is not 
the motivating force in or the basis of Schopenhauer's 
ethics. It is precisely here that an impasse has been 
reached. 
According to Christian spirituality, it is God's 
reality which ultimately is the focal point for ethical 
action—notwithstanding the ideal of doing goodness for 
the sake of goodness alone. For if one begins by exam-
ining the teaching of Jesus--even though such an 
endeavor is incidental to this inquiry--Jesus' theocen-
tric view of life serves as the basis for his entire 
ethic. 1' 0 A brief examination would be illuminating. 
The cornerstone of Jesus' teaching, of course, is 
his proclamation of the Kingdom of God: "The time is 
fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent and 
believe in the Gospel." RSV (Mk 1:15). In fact, the 
concept of a personal, loving God is presupposed 
through the entirety of Jesus' teaching to such an ex-
tent that he sees no need for a rational foundation for 
his ethics. 1' 1 Thus, it is not pity for the miseries 
of another, induced by a consciousness of one's own, 
that results in love of neighbor—that effects the new 
righteousness. Rather, love for neighbor grows out of 
a stance—a state of being--rooted in God in expecta-
tion of His future. 1 , 1 "It is", as Schnack enburg 
writes, "the foundation of this utterly resolute love 
for God that love of the neighbor is built up." 1* 1 
Authentic Christian piety, therefore, is rooted in 
and directed toward God. The one giving alms should 
not sound the trumpet before him so that all might mar-
vel at his magnanimity of heart (Mt. 6:2). The one 
praying should do so in the privacy of his room so that 
only God sees him (Mt. 6:5). And the one fasting 
should not make an ostentatious show of himself (Mt. 
6:16). In short, authentic piety is to exist for God 
as a slave would for his Lord (cf. Lk. 17:7 ff.). Such 
a piety clings to God with an 'unreserved confidence' 
and lives 'by His hand'.1'* 
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An analysis of The Sayings of the Fathers reveals a 
continuity with the teaching of Jesus insofar as the 
theocentric view of life so integral to Christianity is 
maintained. The following quotations from the corpus 
of the aforementioned collection casts light upon this 
fact: 
Abba Hyperichius said: "Let your mind be ever 
upon the kingdom of heaven, and you will soon win 
its inheritance." 
Abba Poemen said: "A man ought ever to be ab-
sorbing humility and the fear of God, as the nos-
trils breathe air in and out." 
A brother asked Abba Sisois: "I observe my own 
mind and I see that it is recollected and intent 
upon God." And the old man said to him: "There 
is no great thing that your mind should be with 
God. The great thing is to see ourself to be 
lower than every created being. Bodily toil will 
put it right, and will lead you on the way to 
humility.111** 
It is apparent, therefore, that the theocentric 
view of life remained characteristic of the monks of 
the desert despite the negativism that had crept into 
their spirituality. John Cassian's Conferences but-
tress the point I have been trying to make. i T i And, by 
way of adding icing to the cake, the Rule of Saint 
Benedict did not encounter any difficulty winning 
acceptance because of its theo-christocentric charac-
ter 1* 7 but because of its lax spirit 1**—which cer-
tainly sheds light upon the period in question! 
Hence, though Schopenhauer is right in stressing 
the negative character of early Christian asceticism, 
even an overly negative Christian asceticism is not 
willing to part with its otherworldly and transcendent 
God. For to do so would shatter its distinct charac-
ter. The God of the ascetics was someone very real in-
deed! 
In conjunction with what has been said above, it 
necessarily follows that authentic Christian asceticism 
receives its impetus from the reality of God's pres-
ence. Aversion to material realities is not the pri-
mary motive leading to ascesis. A reference to the 
historical figure Jesus shall again be necessary. 
First of all, from all indications, Jesus was no 
ascetic, as was John the Baptist.1*' Viewing his min-
istry as a time of release from normal religious obli-
gations and as a time of rejoicing, Jesus, while not 
denying the validity of Jewish religious and fasting 
practices, did not believe that his followers should 
fast while 'the bridegroom' was present (Mt. 9:14-15; 
Mk. 2:18-20; Lk. 5:33-35). Imbued with a sense of the 
impending sovereignty of God (hereinbrechenden Gott-
esherrschaft) , Jesus' life-style and demands were per 
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se not ascetical. 1' 9 He was, therefore, open to the 
charge of the Pharisees that he was a glutton, 
drunkard, and friend of sinners and tax-collectors (Mt. 
11:19). And though he did call some individuals to 
special discipleship, the special demands made on the 
disciples (Lk. 14:28-33; Lk. 14:16 ff.) cannot be con-
sidered as a code for a moral elite. 1 7 1 
Jesus' demands were made only in light of the chal-
lenge of the hour. True, following Jesus did involve 
self-renunciation, openness to the possibility of per-
secution—but only because of the kingdom of God. 1 7 2 
It is only because of the kingdom that a man sells ev-
erything he has to buy the field in which he has found 
a treasure (Mt. 13:44). It is because of this kingdom 
that a merchant will sell all he has to obtain the 
pearl of his longing (Mt. 13:45). Poetic images aside, 
it is clear that the motive for renunciation in Jesus' 
teaching was not the worthlessness of life, but the 
all-encompassing sovereignty of God which develops 
irresistibly like yeast in bread (Lk. 13:20-21) and the 
mustard seed that grows into a great tree shielding the 
birds of heaven (Lk. 13:18-19). 
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that 
Jesus never condemned bodily realities for what they 
were in themselves. In all likelihood, he would have 
been horrified at the way some of the desert fathers 
were using scripture to justify their severe penances 
(refer to footnote 157). Perrin's exegesis of Mk. 7:15 
(" . . . there is nothing outside a man which by going 
into him can defile him; but things which come out of a 
man defile him. n) is particularly illuminating in this 
study. Concerning its significance, Perrin writes: 
The Jesus tradition flatly denies that there are 
any external circumstances in the world or of 
human life which can separate a man from God; a 
man can be separated from God only by his own at-
titude and behavior. Not the world, nor life, 
but only man himself is the 'defiling' agent. 
This is perhaps the most radical statement in the 
whole of the Jesus tradition and, as such, it is 
certainly authentic. 1 7 1 
Though Jesus never condemned material realities for 
what they were in themselves, he chastised those who 
relied exclusively on them (Lk. 12:13-21) in view of 
the sovereignty of God. In line with the above, he 
never condemned marriage. He praised it, considering 
it a highly dignified manner of testifying to one's ap-
proval of creation, and distinguished it from celibacy 
only insofar as the latter prefigures the goal of the 
kingdom. 1 7 f c 
From this brief analysis of Jesus' ethic, it is 
evident that Jesus' call for renunciation is based only 
upon the Lordship of God, which requires of everyone a 
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radically new attitude to life in the world. In no way 
is renunciation an end in itself. For the goodness of 
creation is always maintained. 
An analysis of the early Christian communities 
reveals a similar tendency—especially in the case of 
the Pauline communities. Although Paul was convinced 
that the Parousia was imminent, no ascetic program had 
been developed in these early Christian communities. 
Conzelemann succinctly summarizes his ideas on this 
matter in the following passage: 
That no ascetic principle had been developed is 
clear from three areas: (a) food; fasting is not 
ascesis, but is determined by ritual. True, 
ascetic trendencies emerge here and there, but 
they are rejected, for the earth is the Lord's 
and all that is in it (1 Cor. 10-26; cf. Rom. 
14:14, 20; 1 Tim. 4:3f.). (b) sexual ascesis: 
Paul approves of it in view of the dangers at-
tached to it. But he does not make any law (1 
Cor. 7); (c) possessions: riches are not in 
themselves evil, they are dangerous . . . 1 7 4 
Once again, therefore, it is evident that, though 
ascetic tendencies may have their root partly in New 
Testament writings, in no way are phenomenal realities 
condemned for what they are in themselves. It is God's 
sovereignty and/or the imminence of the Parousia that 
calls for a new attitude toward them. Again, the moti-
vation for renunciation is not an end in itself. 
Proceeding along these lines, one does not need a 
sharp eye to discover many examples in patristic liter-
ature that illustrate that ascetical behavior in Chris-
tian literature was primarily motivated by a desire to 
attain union with God. For example, Ignatius of 
Antioch (?-107) renounced his life only because he 
desired to be united with Christ. Bouyer writes that 
Ignatius "evidences no trace of hatred, no misprising, 
of life or of creation. , , , 7 ( 
With regard to the later desert Fathers, it, of 
course, cannot be denied that much negativism charac-
terized their thinking, given the milieu of the times. 
But even they kept God as the ultimate goal of their 
striving and as the end of their sometimes bizarre 
ascesis. 1 7 7 Though it is correct to point out that in 
some cases the proper motivation for their ascesis was 
blurred, their self-renunciation, generally speaking, 
was not primarily or solely motivated from a hatred of 
material realities. 
Moreover, despite their depreciation of the pheno-
menal order, it is important to note that they could 
still appreciate the majesty of creation because of 
this God they sought. 1 7' Even the eccentric and acid-
tongued Jerome, notwithstanding his austere and callous 
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bent, urged a hesitant Heliodorus to withdraw to the 
desert—eyes dry—to take up the cross of Christ. 1 7* 
Clearly, therefore, there is an essential dif-
ference between classical Christian asceticism and the 
self-denial advocated by Schopenhauer. If one elimi-
nates the important fact that Christian asceticism is 
motivated for the sake of God, what would ensue as a 
result would be an asceticism similar to the one pro-
pounded by Schopenhauer. But such a reductionism 
would, needless to say, be totally contrary to the 
nature of Christian asceticism. In this regard, there-
fore, Schopenhauer's demythologization of Christian 
spirituality is destructive. 
But it is destructive in two other key areas which 
also warrant brief consideration. The first concerns 
Schopenhauer's metaphysic, which presupposes an on-
tological pessimism. The second pertains to Schopen-
hauer's contentions that the individual can attain a 
'salvation' of a sort on his own. Both notions, how-
ever, are clearly rejected by classical Christian 
spirituality. 
Although the world and man do not appear to be good 
from an empirical point of view, they are from the 
standpoint of God—as Conzelmann ascertains. 1" Even 
though such a statement does little to convince the 
philosopher wrestling with the problem of evil, a 
Christian asceticism which believes in the Creator God 
cannot opt for a metaphysical pessimism. For it would 
thereby sever itself from its cornerstone: faith in a 
good God. 
Thus, if a metaphysical pessimism is out of the 
picture, matter per se is not sinful. And if matter is 
not per se sinful, death in-itself—at least in the 
Christian framework—has no liberating power of its 
own. It is that which lies beyond that does. Hence, 
death is but a step toward perfection in Christian 
asceticism. In Schopenhauer's Weltanschauung, however, 
it is the final deliverance. 
It is interesting to note that metaphysical pessim-
ism was rejected from the beginning with Paul, the 
apostle to the Gentiles. In his juxtaposition of 
'flesh' and 'spirit' he never taught that man was a 
sinner because of his corporeality. 1' 1 Denying even 
that the 'inner man' was closer to God than the fleshly 
man, he affirmed the neutrality of the anthropological 
(omma ) a"d cosmological ( K600105 ) concepts in his 
theology. " a 
Later Church Fathers remained true to the 
Scriptures and defended the inherent goodness of crea-
tion against Gnostic and Encratite teachings. For 
example, Irenaeus (A.D. 120-202) condemned the En-
cratites for downplaying the dignity of marriage for 
ingratitude to God because of their aversion to 
material realities. 1 , 1 John Chrysostom in the fifth 
century argues with those who "accuse the workmanship 
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of God, and take part with the Manichees . . . ""* 
And the Council of Braga (A.D. 561) categorically con-
demns adherents of metaphysical pessimism." 5 
With regard to the ability of the individual to at-
tain salvation on his own, Schopenhauer's contentions 
that the individual has the dynamism within himself to 
achieve salvation are not in conformity with general 
Christian belief. For holiness is not so much a result 
of moral effort alone, but it is a gift from God in 
authentic Christian spirituality."* 
In this regard, continence and/or celibacy are con-
sidered to be special gifts from God not given to all 
(1 Cor. 7:7; Mt. 19:11). Schillebeeckx underscores 
this when he writes: "The difference between Christian 
and pagan ideals of continence lies at the outset ex-
clusively in the acknowledgement of saving grace . . 
" " T John Cassian's Conferences make the same point: 
"Perfection in the full sense is a gift of God, and it 
is rare indeed.""* 
But since Schopenhauer has severed God from his 
world picture by not taking Him seriously, holiness for 
him is the result of moral effort alone. The ascetic, 
for example, in Schopenhauer's system is illumined by 
the grace of a transcendent God. Quite logically, 
therefore, continence and/or celibacy in the Schopen-
hauerian We1tanschauung are not considered gifts from 
God. Ascetical self-denial arises solely from intui-
tion into the nature of the will which has objectified 
itself in the totality of reality. Herein, therefore, 
lies another decisive reason for maintaining that 
Schopenhauer's demythologization of Christian asceti-
cism is destructive. 
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